Strengthening the Peace and Security Community

A Collaborative Planning Document

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I. Background and history

A group of over 50 activists, scholars and funders, united by a common commitment to promote a more peaceful and just world, free from the threat of weapons of mass destruction, met in January 2003 in Washington to launch a collaborative process to consider how to collectively enhance their common capacity to achieve public policy victories. The impetus for this effort came from two sobering realities: first, that the dramatic changes in the national and international security situation following the September 11 terrorist attacks and the end of the Cold War offer nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) new opportunities to reframe peace and security issues and provides new urgency to regain lost political relevance and effectiveness; and second, that significant reduction in foundation support for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation compels consideration of how to take full advantage of existing resources and to supplement them.

Over the following eight months this diverse group, named the Planning Group, worked diligently to define its shared vision and goals, further its understanding of the challenges and opportunities before it, and develop a strategic plan for the next three to five years to bring this vision closer to reality. The collaborative planning process was designed to balance diverse organizational perspectives and develop a shared vision and set of recommendations. In addition to producing a tangible plan, this process enhanced the sense of community and created opportunities for conversations across different branches of the peace and security community. This helped to deepen relationships and gave rise to new collaborative efforts.

The Planning Group met on three more occasions in Washington, DC. Each daylong meeting was followed by intense work by a subset of the group, the Design Team, to prepare for the next stage of this collaborative process. The Design Team's role was to design an inclusive and efficient process. The nine-member team also synthesized and analyzed the content of the Planning Group discussions, as well as other discussions, and drafted material for subsequent meetings. At key points, members of the Design Team, along with members of the Planning Group, led discussions with others who had experience and expertise in relevant fields to share the group's conclusions to that point, and seek improvements to various parts of the plan. Staff from the Interaction Institute for Social Change, a Boston-based organization that works with non-profit communities and organizations, facilitated and planned the meetings and helped the Design Team construct the entire process. The Ploughshares Fund paid all direct costs of this process and many people gave generously of their time and talents.

This report aims to communicate the Planning Group's broad understanding of today's challenges, and the shared goals, conclusions and strategic recommendations that emerged through the collaborative planning process. The members of the Design Team wrote this report in their individual capacities and recognize that each participant in the larger collaborative process may not agree with every point

contained in it. Participants are listed in their individual capacities in the Appendices. Planning Group members are in general agreement with the report's findings. Their parent organizations were not asked to formally endorse the report, therefore no organizational position is represented.

The report represents the conclusion of the collaborative planning process as originally envisioned and is offered as a starting point for greater coordination, focus and action by the peace and security community. It is hoped that this document will be used by the community to guide the strategic planning and programs of individuals, NGOs and funders, as well as be a valuable fundraising and outreach tool. It is to be a fluid product that will continue to be improved and revised by the community over the next five years. The report starts by briefly presenting the Planning Group's understanding of the challenges to global security. This section is followed by a discussion of how to create a more peaceful world and secure America, including a statement of a "Vision for the Future" that was developed and agreed to by the Planning Group.[1] The second half of this document considers how the peace and security community can realize this vision. It presents a set of recommended areas of focus and the most urgent and important goals in these areas. The document includes a separate, detailed action plan to accomplish each of these goals that was developed by members of the Planning Group with help from other relevant experts. The plans are followed by a discussion of what should happen to achieve success, a suggested timeline, and the human and financial resources needed for implementation.

Next steps

An Implementation Committee is being formed to facilitate continuing collaborative work based on the strategic planning document. The committee will have approximately ten members, several of whom also served on the Design Team to ensure continuity. Its members will come out of the following sectors of the community in roughly equal numbers: research and analysis, policy advocacy and lobbyists, communication and public relations, grassroots organizing, and foundations.

One of the first actions of the Implementation Committee will be to oversee establishment of Working Groups as recommended in the strategic plan. Each Working Group will have a member on the Implementation Committee to facilitate overall coordination. It is anticipated that the Planning Group, with additional members as appropriate, will reconvene in early spring 2004 to ensure that the plan implementation is headed in the right direction and that current challenges and opportunities are addressed. It will meet as a group approximately twice a year thereafter.

[1] We are grateful to the Fourth Freedom Forum for permission to draw on its forthcoming paper, "Toward a More Secure America,"and to Lawrence Korb and the Council on Foreign Relations for permission to draw on his paper, "A New National Security Strategy in an Age of Terrorists, Tyrants, and Weapons of Mass Destruction," Council on Foreign Relations, 2003.

II. The Challenges and Issues

The new century is off to a poor start, frustrating the hopes for greater international harmony that blossomed with the peaceful end of the Cold War. Profound security threats come from proliferation and the threat of use of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons; international terrorism; and persistent, deadly intrastate and regional conflicts. Deepening global poverty and abysmal governance in much of the world fuel these conflicts. In addition, severe global problems including the spread of communicable diseases on an epidemic scale, mass migration, humanitarian catastrophes, shortages of resources like fresh water, and environmental perils like climate change will become security threats, as they link the fates of people around the globe from New York to New Delhi.

In the United States, the events of September 11, 2001 fundamentally changed how the public thinks about security, creating for many a new and disorienting sense of vulnerability. The Bush Administration's response was to redefine the threats facing the United States and to launch a "war on terror" that includes, according to the Administration, major, on-going military action in both Afghanistan and Iraq and significantly enhanced authority and power of domestic law enforcement. Global terrorist networks and outlaw regimes were elevated to first-order threats. The greatest security danger faced by the United States was declared to be the possibility that terrorists aided by tyrants will acquire and use nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons -- defined in the Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy as the "crossroads of radicalism and technology."

Terrorism

Terrorism itself is nothing new, but the increased access to technology over the past decades has made terrorists more lethal and agile. "Failed" states and grinding poverty exacerbate this threat. When governments cannot maintain law and order or fail to satisfy their population's basic needs – including for political expression -- terrorists use the resulting power vacuum as a safe haven or a recruiting ground. The danger of terrorism will grow if the world's deadliest weapons are allowed to proliferate. In the nuclear realm, the proliferation risk is greatly increased by the possibility that nuclear technology, fissile material and know-how from the former Soviet Union will be stolen or otherwise acquired by proliferating states or political and/or terrorist group. Efforts to address this risk have fallen short despite significant U.S. and Russian attention over the past decade.

Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Meanwhile, the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) regime is under stress and fraying badly. It has been especially damaged by the renewal of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs, the reality that Iran could use its advanced nuclear capabilities to make weapons, the continued non-membership of nuclear-armed India, Pakistan and Israel, and the failure of the other five nuclear weapons states to fulfill

their NPT obligations by moving toward elimination of their arsenals. Contrary to the underlying premise of the Treaty, the United States continues to assign nuclear weapons a primary role in its foreign and military policy. Bush Administration policies call for an expanded role for nuclear weapons in countering rogue regimes and attacking chemical and biological targets. U.S. and Russian nuclear arms control reductions have come to a premature standstill with a 2002 treaty that does not require the elimination of a single bomb or delivery system and provides no verification mechanism. As a result, both the U.S. and Russia plan to retain many thousands of nuclear weapons 15 years after the end of the Cold War.

Thus, although the danger of a nuclear war engulfing the planet receded substantially with the end of the Cold War, the possibility of limited nuclear exchanges or accidents still jeopardizes large populations and areas of the planet. And although the nonproliferation regime has succeeded well beyond initial expectations in containing the number of nuclear powers, a critical lack of political support and need for additional enforcement and verification tools is limiting its effectiveness.

New Weapons Dangers

New technologies are also giving rise to new dangers. In the biological realm, several governments continue to maintain large biological weapons stocks. Scientists are just beginning to understand how new techniques and materials can be manipulated by those intent on using biotechnology as weapons of mass destruction. In the frontiers of outer space and cyber-space, technology has also created new opportunities and risks. The United States' military argues that electronic warfare against satellites and nuclear weapons command and control systems is an emerging threat, and that as a result, the deployment of weapons in space may be just over the horizon. Both these developments would be very destabilizing, creating severe vulnerabilities for both commercial and military space systems.

Regional Conflicts

A number of serious conflicts around the world with potential for escalation, many involving weapons of mass destruction, pose a dizzying array of challenges to U.S. and world security. The United Nations Security Council lacks the necessary degree of consensus and political authority to contribute substantially to their resolution. Most prominently, these security challenges include:

- Chaos and carnage in Iraq under US-British occupation, obstructing the reconstruction of its infrastructure and industry and its political transition while also spawning new terrorists and greater anti-Western hostility in the Middle East;
- A looming showdown between North Korea and the U.S. that, if not rapidly and skillfully handled, could lead to a nuclear weapons capable North Korea that would destabilize Northeast Asia for decades to come;

- A divided regime in Iran that may withdraw from the NPT and develop nuclear weapons;
- The resurgence of the Taliban and drug economy in Afghanistan while the international nation-building project sputters along fitfully;
- Lack of progress implementing the Middle East road map and achieving a just and equitable settlement between Israel and Palestine;
- A volatile South Asian subcontinent, where nuclear-armed and heavily militarized enemies, India and Pakistan, face each other across the disputed territory of Kashmir;
- Civil and ethnic conflicts, fueled by the arms trade, in Africa, Latin America, and Asia are killing thousands and arresting the economic and social development of these impoverished regions.

U.S. Security Policy and Politics

Unfortunately, the Bush Administration has embarked on a path that complicates and, in some cases, compounds these and other key challenges to global and national security. Its approach departs from that of its predecessors in several key areas. First, as previously noted, following the September 11th attacks, global terrorists networks and outlaw regimes are considered the major security threat. Second, official policy stresses the value of using military force, including preemption, and de-emphasizes the role of deterrence, containment, and diplomacy. In a related vein, it holds that the U.S. must maintain total military dominance to deter the emergence of threats. Third, it de-emphasizes the role and value of international institutions, agreements and treaties. Last, it redefines the problem of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction so that it is not the weapons per se that are the problem. Rather, the problem is "bad guys" who might get the weapons.

The United States war against Iraq was in many ways a trial run of the Administration's new approach, embodying the above principles. The Administration asserted the U.S. right and need to attack any country that poses a potential threat in the future with weapons of mass destruction. It launched a war in absence of international support or evidence of an imminent threat, and in spite of a successful on-going international effort to address potential threats with on-the-ground, UN-mandated inspections and military and economic containment. The war, along with other Administration policies, is a rejection of the fundamental premise of a nonproliferation regime that relies on international controls, monitoring and sanctions.

The difficult and dangerous U.S. military occupation of Iraq demonstrates the downsides of unilateral actions and efforts to force political changes from the barrel of a gun. The Bush Administration's failure to find clear evidence of weapons of

mass destruction in Iraq demonstrates the effectiveness of the peaceful policies followed by the international community to disarm Iraq and the liability of "preemptive" or "preventive" wars. The decision to end UN inspections and invade on the basis of faulty intelligence claims of an imminent threat from Iraqi chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programs has eroded U.S. credibility and weakened its ability to win international consensus to deal with other security challenges. The war undermined the international institutions and mechanisms, such as weapons inspections and sanctions, which have constrained proliferation. Moreover, the U.S. war against Iraq may provide some states with an excuse to pursue such weapons programs to deter a similar attack, and other states with a precedent for preemptive military action against perceived threats to their security.

The Bush Administration's foreign policies have also produced substantial opposition and concern at home. Daily violence in Iraq, along with mounting bills to the U.S. taxpayer, is underscoring for the American public the risks of a unilateralist, militarist approach to foreign policy. At the same time, the terrorist attacks and war against Iraq also have had profound implications for popular attitudes toward security. Americans feel more insecure, but also better appreciate the connection between personal and global security and the importance of international cooperation to deal with global dangers. They are more aware of the threat posed by weapons of mass destruction and the dangerous intersection between failed states, authoritarian regimes, and terrorists, and they expect the United States to lead efforts to address these threats. Nuclear, and increasingly, biological weapons proliferation has become a mainstream national security concern involving not only the traditional expert community, but a wider spectrum of national policymakers. A variety of new constituencies—law enforcement, first responders, public health—most domestic in orientation, are now concerned with efforts to promote homeland security.

III. Towards a peaceful world and a more secure America

Our Vision of the Future

As our world has grown more perilous and global problems have become more intractable, so also have the foundations been laid for effective international efforts to create a more peaceful and just world. The international community has made tremendous strides in establishing an agreed body of norms and rules governing inter-state behavior and human rights and in creating effective international organizations tasked with the achievement and/or enforcement of these norms and rules. Unofficial global policy networks have also emerged as international problem solvers. National objectives like financial stability, public health, law enforcement, and the protection of the environment and human rights are now seen as international public goods and are increasingly promoted through trans-governmental networks of bankers, regulators, scientists, NGO activists, and national law enforcement officers. In the long march of human history, the individual's "community of accountability" – moral, legal, and political accountability – has expanded from the family to the

village, to the city-state to the nation-state, to regional groups, to the entire community of nations, represented by the United Nations Charter and its Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

The United Nations system and related official multilateral initiatives are imperfect and must be strengthened and adapted to meet new challenges. Power and wealth imbalances, inadequate resources, and the leaders of a handful of states unwilling or unable to observe the standards established by the international community have undermined the goal of peace and security on the national and international level. Other leaders have ignored their legal and political obligations and have mocked the very ideals of the United Nations system. Nevertheless, this framework of multilateralism provides the basis for genuine international cooperation to solve global problems and to provide security for all people. It points the way for humankind to escape from a past dominated by world wars and perpetual violent conflict that were a result of nationalism, empire and militarism.

The question is often posed in the United States: in light of its military supremacy and dominant economy, is it true, as the current Administration believes, that the U.S. is better off on its own, unconstrained to take whatever action it regards as necessary, including, most prominently, military action, to advance its interests and security? Or is its long-term security best pursued through international law and multilateral cooperation? The answer one gives depends, in part, on judgments about the utility and morality of using force to addresses today's threats. At a more fundamental level, it reflects one's fundamental views and aspirations for the future.

The vision of the future that guides and inspires the peace and security community represented in these pages is as follows:

Vision of the Future

We envision a world in which international cooperation, international law and economic opportunity provide the greatest security for people in the United States and around the world, and the greatest opportunity for all people to live in free, healthy, and just societies.

We envision a world in which nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction are not considered legitimate instruments of political or military power, and a universally accepted regime of rules, norms, and monitoring capabilities enforces legal prohibitions against their acquisition, possession and use.

We envision the United States fully respecting the authority of, as well as actively participating in the creation and empowerment of, this enhanced international system for preventing and resolving conflict and achieving disarmament. To this end, we envision an engaged and informed citizenry with equal opportunity to participate in the political system and with accountable and responsive elected officials.

An Effective International and National Security Policy

At the heart of our vision for the future is creation of a world in which people are freed from fear for their safety. This is consistent with the fundamental responsibility of national policy to provide for the safety and well being of its people. The prevention of deadly conflict and violence must be a priority of nations, as well as international institutions. We do not believe that on-going, tremendously destructive wars are inevitable. Nor is it a given that states will keep deployed nuclear arsenals forever. Our vision rejects the notion that one state can pursue its own "national" security with little regard for the safety and security of people in other lands. The human toll from the military actions of states acting in "defense" of its national interests can negate their contribution to enhancing security. (A particularly obvious example is a policy that threatens a massive nuclear attack that would kill thousands or millions, in the name of security. The shelling of a village where a terrorist is thought to be hiding raises similar issues.) We do not believe that any one state can achieve enduring security by a strategy that causes others to remain insecure and threatened. In today's world, a secure and stable order, from the local to the global, cannot be sustained by military might or repression.

A second principle of our vision is that we can successfully confront the array of challenges to global security through cooperative international efforts and international institutions. The United States, despite its dominance, cannot address today's transnational problems alone. Rather, its status confers a special obligation to uphold and reinforce international law by its own actions and by assisting in the verification and enforcement of compliance with international law. As an open and dynamic society, with economic and political interests around the world, the U.S. has perhaps the most to gain from a world governed by rule of law. Use of overwhelming military power cannot ensure success in meeting today's threats -- whether they come from terrorism, weapons proliferation, disease or resource scarcity -- and, in many cases, would be unconstructive, particularly if it is used unilaterally and preemptively.

Meeting the Challenge of Terrorism

The U.S. war against terrorism illustrates the indispensable role of international cooperation. International arms control initiatives, sanctions, and border controls are necessary to contain outlaw regimes and groups. Joint law enforcement and intelligence operations, and measures to track and freeze the flow of money, are critical to combating them. Ultimately, the solution to terrorism must include some means of redressing the political grievances and conditions that give rise to the terrorists and their sympathizers, even though they do not justify terrorism. If coercive action is necessary, genuinely international action confers legitimacy and shares the burden among many. And the job of rebuilding states emerging from war or violent conflict requires the assistance and resources of many.

Eliminating the Dangers of Weapons of Mass Destruction

With regard to chemical, biological and nuclear weapons, the most effective long-term strategy is to strengthen the interlocking set of treaties, cooperative threat reduction initiatives, export controls and monitoring and enforcement institutions that form the global nonproliferation regime. The regime's objective is to make the acquisition, possession and use of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems morally and politically anathema, technically overwhelming, and economically prohibitive.

There are several important steps that must be taken to make it harder for terrorists or proliferating states to get nuclear materials and to develop and deliver nuclear weapons. The Cooperative Threat Reduction program and related efforts to control and secure fissile materials in the former Soviet Union and globally should be better funded and implemented. Improvements are needed to the global standards and measures for the physical protection of civilian and military nuclear facilities. A longer term, but ultimately indispensable measure, is a treaty banning all further production of fissile material and a global fissile material accounting system to place a ceiling on the quantity of weapons-usable nuclear material produced and to track its whereabouts. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which awaits ratification by the U.S. and several other states before it enters into force, is a vital step toward preventing further development of nuclear weapons by those that have arsenals and thereby reducing the role of nuclear weapons. New efforts at the global and regional level are needed to check the development and transfer of ballistic missiles that can deliver deadly payloads.

Compliance with disarmament and nonproliferation agreements can be strictly verified and enforced if there is the political will to do so. A more effective, better financed International Atomic Energy Agency, and adoption of more intrusive inspection procedures would greatly help the agency do a better job monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention should be accelerated and it should be a high priority of all governments to agree to verification provisions that would give the decades old Biological Weapons Convention some teeth. Variations of the policies that were supported by the world community for the peaceful disarmament of Iraq after the first Gulf War – rigorous inspections, destruction of prohibited weaponry, targeted sanctions and multilateral coercive diplomacy – can and should be used in other situations to detect and deter cheating, and when necessary to enforce compliance.

Leadership by Example

Another principle of our vision is that the nuclear powers should practice what they preach. The US, in particular, should dramatically reduce the role of nuclear weapons in international affairs and should seek ways to accelerate progress toward the eventual elimination of all arsenals of weapons of mass destruction, including its

own. When the weapons states continue to place a high value on their nuclear arsenals, it reinforces just how important these weapons can be as sources of power and prestige for others. Moreover, this stance significantly undermines their ability to persuade India, Pakistan, North Korea and Iran to abandon nuclear weapons programs. As long as nations do possess nuclear weapons, their role must be confined to deterring the use of nuclear weapons by others.

The Role of Military Force

A cooperative foreign policy does not avoid the use of military force; it relegates it to a last resort and recognizes the limits of its usefulness to advance national and international security. Military power has an important role in defending one's own nation from attack and the threat of force can be necessary for the success of coercive diplomacy. In circumstances that defy proactive strategies and present an imminent threat to international security and human life and rights on a large scale, many members of the peace and security community believe that the actual use of force may be required. Given the profound effect of such undertakings, they should have broad international support and authorization from the UN Security Council or other regional security bodies.

The use of military force by the United States without international endorsement and/or preemptively invites others to follow the superpower's lead, creating a more dangerous, uncertain world for everyone. Over time preemption weakens deterrence by encouraging countries to adopt precarious "launch-on-warning" force postures. Preemptive military strategies often rely on inherently ambiguous threat assessments. Moreover, unilateral preventive action against states that try to acquire a nuclear arsenal may encourage others to hasten their efforts to acquire nuclear weapons in an effort to avoid a similar fate. Elements of such a reaction can be found in both North Korean and Iranian stance regarding its nuclear programs following the U.S. war against Iraq. Preventing or eliminating the source of these tensions and dangerous weapons developments that irritate them is the wiser strategy.

Our vision is surely an optimistic one. It rests on the belief that humankind is capable of applying reason and the "force of law" to create peace – refusing to succumb to the primitive "law of force," which can offer no lasting peace. Our vision is also surely more realistic than one that assumes that today's interconnected world, bristling with destructive weapons and besieged by conflicts and problems, can be kept in check and at bay by American military power. To make our vision reality will require a concerted campaign involving deeper understanding of and creative solutions to security problems, public education and mobilization, and political organizing and advocacy. Needless to say, all this work requires the wise use both of existing, and increased, financial and human resources.

IV. A Collaborative Action Plan

Strategic Areas of Focus

A successful campaign to reorient national security policy and achieve specific policy goals requires that the peace and security community work in many areas requiring different skills and approaches. As a first step to developing a strategic plan, the Planning Group identified the five to ten key areas of work (listed below) in which the community should focus its collective efforts in order to achieve maximum results. To be most effective, the community must ensure there is coordination among these different efforts and that the relative capacities of, and resources used by, the different areas are consistent with their importance in terms of time urgency and overall impact. A community survey currently is being developed to gather complete data to give us an accurate understanding of how staff, resources and capabilities within the broader peace and security community are allocated in the specified functional areas and across different issues and policy areas.

The determination of these areas of focus was informed by earlier discussions within the Planning Group of the challenges – both internal and external -- faced by the peace and security community and how to overcome them. Several issues emerged as most pressing. The community's "message" and how it is communicated needs much improvement. It must avoid becoming irrelevant to people by connecting recommended policies and arguments to the core concerns of most citizens, as well as to a bigger picture of how to make the world a better, safer place. Along the same lines, the "message" must address gut-level issues of right and wrong as well as respond effectively to "headline" security problems with compelling, cooperative solutions. The excellent research and analysis products of the community must be translated into appropriate language for different audiences, marketed and broadly disseminated, and their underlying ideas communicated by effective spokespeople.

A related obstacle faced by the peace and security community – symptomatic of its "message" difficulties and exacerbated by it – is isolation. It is critical that the peace and security community ally with and collaborate with other politically progressive efforts. It is equally critical that there is better communication and collaboration among the different parts of the community.

One particular area of work that needs improvement is the community's overall capacity to influence and engage Congress. In light of the "external" challenge posed by a hostile Administration with support from a slim majority in Congress, it is critical that this be an area of community emphasis and strength. Yet another challenge, which has clear implications for any strategic plan, is the challenge of securing sufficient resources to support existing organizations and enable an expansion and intensification of the work performed by the community. Consideration of these challenges and others, as well as the opportunities they present, led to the identification of seven priority areas in which to focus our collective action.

Key Strategic Areas of Focus

1. Develop and refine the ideas, solutions and policies that further disarmament, cooperative security and the rule of international law.
2. Develop the message and means to effectively promote these ideas and policies.
3. Engage and mobilize diverse sectors of the public.
4. Influence U.S. government officials and policy.
5. Build effective and diverse organizational capacity and strengthen the collaborative community infrastructure.
6. Support a new generation of leaders, activists and experts.
7. Increase and sustain funding for the Peace and Security Community.

Long Term Goals for the next three to five years

Effective work in each of the above areas is dependent on a number of accomplishments that will require many years of work. This collaborative plan for the next three to five years focuses only on the most urgent and important of these goals as determined by the Planning Group. A complete list of goals related to each area of focus is in the Appendix C. The group prioritized the following nine goals for immediate action.

1. We will enhance collaboration among funders, think tanks, policy groups, advocacy/activist groups and academics to maximize the impact of each sector. (Area of Focus 5)

2. We will develop a suite of position statements and policy frameworks that address emerging and existing security challenges, along with supporting materials (e.g., summaries, talking points), to be used in the presidential campaign and beyond. (Area of Focus 1)

3. We will develop initial message recommendations to argue for our policy agenda based on a more complete understanding of how people think about these issues. (Area of Focus 2)

4. We will recruit and engage a number of messengers from Congress, academia, think ranks, business, and the media. (Area of Focus 2)

5. We will develop a legislative strategy informed by our policy agenda that builds our base and appeals to broader political constituencies. (Area of Focus 4)

6. We will increase the membership base of organizations and the number of partner organizations ten-fold, in part by developing and formalizing alliances that were formed in the anti-war movement. (Area of Focus 3)

7. We will seek alliances and collaboration with a number of other key sectors and constituencies (e.g., labor, environment, Latino/a, Arab/south Asian, Jewish, students, retired military, business, faith, women, human rights and other communities of color). (Area of Focus 3)

8. We will focus on increasing capacity in the following areas: direct and grassroots lobbying, leadership development, internet-based advocacy and list enhancement, recruiting a new generation of leaders, retaining high quality staff, nurturing and utilizing effective spokespeople and experts, and fundraising. (Area of Focus 5)

9. We will develop a fundraising strategy that identifies funding needs and assesses current allocations, identifies new sources and opportunities, determines how to increase the utility and efficiency of grantmaking, and is aimed at overcoming immediate funding shortfall. (Area of Focus 7)

Much valuable work has been done, and is currently being done, to advance these goals. But a more systematic and deliberate effort to fully realize them is critical. There are points of intersection among them – some are dependent on others or the same tactics may advance several goals at once. By isolating these goals we hope to encourage greater awareness of the entire community – activists, scholars, practitioners and funders – of the totality of what needs to be done. This awareness is the first step toward greater coordination of the parts to ensure that as a community we are not leaving some critical tasks ignored or ineffectively addressed, and to ensure that we build on each other's work.

Tactics to accomplish the Goals

The Planning Group identified tactics, or separate tasks, to accomplish each goal. Small groups worked on different goals and input was also sought from others with relevant expertise. The tactics designed to achieve each goal are presented in the following pages as recommendations for specific actions to pursue. They represent the best ideas of experienced and knowledgeable political thinkers, within the constraints imposed by the realities of limited human and financial resources. Although additional resources are needed to carry out the tactics recommended to accomplish virtually every goal, they are not of such magnitude to be unrealistic. As will be discussed further below, in addition to increasing the net total resources, there should also be some savings from reallocation of resources and realizing greater productivity from collaboration.

GOAL 1

We will enhance collaboration among funders, think tanks, policy groups, advocacy/activist groups and academics to maximize the impact of each sector.

Tactics

1. Assign the Implementation Committee responsibility to ensure that the strategic plan is implemented. The committee should widely disseminate and coordinate the work undertaken by the various Working Groups and other entities executing parts of the plan. Mechanisms to do so include conference calls, periodic briefings, and development of list-serves to encourage information exchanges and notification of events and activities, taking into account existing mechanisms.

2. Clarify the respective roles of existing structures such as the Director's Forum, Coolfont retreat, Monday lobby working groups and the Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative. Strengthen and expand them to encourage communications and coordination in the peace and security community, among organizations in and outside of Washington, DC, and, when possible, with new groups and constituencies.

3. Create opportunities for the peace and security community to meet (at least two times per year) for strategic planning, information exchanges and organizational development trainings. Building relationships between different sectors of the peace and security community should be emphasized.

GOAL 2

We will develop a suite of position statements and policy frameworks that address emerging and existing security challenges, along with supporting materials (e.g., summaries, talking points), to be used in the presidential campaign and beyond.

Tactics

1. Form working group of 5-6 persons assigned to the task of developing and producing a series of 2-page position papers on discreet, major peace and security issues.
    - The first paper, to be produced in the immediate future, should be geared to the election campaign (e.g. "Ten Steps the Next President should take to Make the World Safer").
    - Other topics might address the security issues raised in sections II and III of this report and should draw from the work of the communications/message Working Group (Goal 3 and 4.)
    - Papers should describe the problem and possible solutions. They should include, as appropriate, specific executive branch action and/or legislative proposals; talking points (informed by message research tasks); and a list of related resources (reports, experts, spokespeople, NGO efforts.)
    - Papers should draw upon existing material and advice of knowledgeable persons and policymakers outside the working groups.
    - Papers should be updated/revised every 6-8 months and new position papers should be developed as needed.

2. Draft two prestigious co-chairs to lead a meeting with a dozen other opinion leaders and key groups to get comments, suggested revisions, and endorsements on position statement. Such a meeting will be needed following each major update or addition to the series of papers.

3. Disseminate final products to a broad but targeted list through coalitions, organization networks, mailings to media and policymakers, and websites.

GOAL 3

We will develop initial message recommendations to argue for our policy agenda based on a more complete understanding of how people think about these issues.

Tactics

1. Drawing on the data from current projects on message development and public opinion (e.g. Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Center for American Progress, Open Society Institute, Proteus Fund), draft alternative arguments and language that support the elements of the vision statement and key policy objectives. In the course of reviewing and analyzing existing data, determine whether additional research is needed and, if so, how best to get it done. A standing working group of NGO representatives and professionals should be established to oversee this and the following tasks. Ideally, this same group will also perform the responsibilities of the "messenger" working group envisioned in Goal 4.

2. Identify priority target audiences for message testing and conduct tests (e.g. focus groups, surveys) with those selected audiences. The target audiences will reflect the chosen political strateg(ies). Do a second round of testing with policy makers and opinion shapers of those messages that were best received in the first round.

3. Establish criteria for evaluating message impact conduct evaluations and refine messages accordingly. This should be done periodically.

4. Brief and disseminate conclusions of work to relevant NGOs and sympathetic policymakers. Choose an existing, central website to post results and background information. Both these tasks should be done on a regular and on-going basis.

GOAL 4

We will recruit and engage a number of messengers from Congress, academia, think ranks, business, and the media.

Tactics

1. Establish a working group (approx 8 members) composed of NGO and independent communication experts. (Ideally, this working group would have responsibilities for the tactics under goal 3 also.) The group should meet via conference call every month, or more frequently if rapid response is needed, and have the following functions, described in more detail in the tactics below:
    - Review priority messages, guided by polling and public opinion work;
    - Identify/recruit candidate spokespeople;
    - Oversee promotion and training, if needed, of chosen spokespeople;
    - Be alert to and respond to opportunities provided by unfolding events or timely, new work by community members;
    - Send periodic emails to a comprehensive list of peace and security NGOs with recommended talking points and brief background material on priority messages;
    - Facilitate coordination of existing "messenger" work done by different NGOs.

2. Identify and recruit spokespeople, including individuals in the following three general categories: approximately 10 generalists who are willing and able to speak about a wide range of topics at short notice to diverse audiences; issue experts who are used more discriminatingly and especially in crises; high profile and/or "unusual suspects," also used discriminatingly. The selection of spokespeople should be guided by findings from polling and public opinion work.

3. Hire professional firm(s) to handle promotion of individuals, including managing all aspects of earned media, paid media, and writing and speaking opportunities. Again, polling and public opinion data should be used to guide selection of media placement. With help from the working group, firms should be alert to opportunities for cross-promotion (e.g. scheduling radio and television appearances to capitalize on book or article publication).

4. Hire professional firm to provide training to "generalist" spokespeople and others, as resources permit.

GOAL 5

We will develop a legislative strategy informed by our policy agenda that builds our base and appeals to broader political constituencies.

Tactics

1. Reestablish a "breakfast group" of Congressional Members to meet regularly with NGOs and develop legislative strategies. This group should be a vehicle for both ongoing Member education/briefing, and, as markups approach, for dividing-up amendment responsibilities and Member-to-Member lobbying assignments
2. Establish small core groups of key Senate and House staffers (e.g. 6- 12 members each) who meet regularly (e.g. bi-weekly) along with NGO lobbyists to develop legislative strategies, bills, and amendments for promotion by the Members group (in #1 above), and who will assume responsibility for the relevant Authorization and Appropriations Bill each year.
    a. As political needs dictate, and legislators' interests allow, expand this meeting to include additional offices that indicate a willingness to pursue specific parts of the overall agenda;
    b. Encourage timely preparation of amendments (including vetting by legislative counsel) for advance consideration and possible refinement by the group;
    c. Use this group to generate more opportunities for direct face-to-face briefings of Members of Congress by NGO security experts.
3. Encourage and promote venues and opportunities for Member mentoring, collaboration and education (e.g., develop "outreach program" for freshman members of House and Senate Armed Services Committee; pair more junior Members with Members who play leadership role; host dinners or other gatherings for members with experts.)
4. Convene an annual NGO consultation before the congressional session begins to discuss and develop a legislative agenda and strategy. Participants should include NGO staff with Hill experience.
5. Develop a coordinated "grasstops" strategy similar to the Partnership Project in the environmental community, whereby NGOs pool membership lists and cross-reference them with election lists to identify political donors of key target members. (The Directors' Forum has taken some initial steps on this idea.)

GOAL 6

We will increase the membership base of organizations and the number of partner organizations ten-fold, in part by developing and formalizing alliances that were formed in the anti-war movement.

Tactics

1. Utilizing information collected by the community survey, assess where existing membership bases are strongest (which organizations, in which regions), and which membership-building techniques have been most effective. Recommend steps the peace and security community (individual organizations and collectively) could take to strengthen and expand membership.

2. Explore successful models in other communities to expand and strengthen membership, e.g., the Partnership Project, PeaceLEAP. Recommend ways to apply these models to the larger peace and security community.

3. To recruit new e-activists or "members," establish a central action-oriented web site(s), (along the lines of MoveOn.org or the former DontBlowIt.org), from which email action alerts focused exclusively on peace and security will emanate, as well as online marketing efforts.

4. Identify 10-15 "battleground" states in which to develop a collaborative strategy to conduct voter education and action on peace and security issues.

5. Develop a broad advertising campaign to recruit new members, possibly using template radio, newspaper and Internet ads, or magazine, television and radio public service announcements, for use by local state, regional and national organizations or chapters.

6. Work with major anti-war coalitions (Win Without War, United for Peace and Justice) to encourage their organizations and members to remain active, and increase their involvement in peace and security issues. A short-term tactic is to organize and participate in a planning retreat in early January 2004 with Win Without War.

7. Establish a small Working Group of field directors and organizers to carry out the tasks listed above.

GOAL 7

We will seek alliances and collaboration with a number of other key sectors and constituencies (e.g., labor, environment, Latino/a, Arab/south Asian, Jewish, students, retired military, business, faith, women, human rights and other communities of color).

Tactics

1. Undertake a "mapping" exercise to determine the state of existing collaborations at the national and local levels – i.e., which organizations are working with which targeted constituencies and where?

2. Choose approximately 10 key states out of the larger set of high priority states already identified by major peace and security groups in which to focus efforts to enhance collaboration with other constituencies.

3. Using information from the "mapping" exercise, identify existing peace and security organizations in the targeted states and opportunities to extend existing collaboration efforts or to model new efforts on those undertaken successfully in other regions.

4. Develop and implement a national strategy for strengthening alliances with students. Ensure that major peace and security NGOs establish regular contact with student networks (e.g. Peace Action's student network, SPAN; WAND's network, STAND; Student Pugwash, student Physician for Social Responsibility chapters) to offer speakers, literature and program ideas as well as support for these organizations' activities.

5. Develop and implement a national strategy for strengthening alliances with faith-based organizations, building on the work of the Nuclear Reduction and Disarmament Initiative at the Center for Theology and Public Policy and the anti-war efforts of the National Council of Churches.

6. Develop and implement a *long-term* national strategy for strengthening alliances with the other named constituencies, including in particular the following high priority ones: women's organizations, environmentalists, latino/a organizations, retired military, and business leaders.

GOAL 8

We will focus on increasing capacity in the following areas: direct and grassroots lobbying, leadership development, internet-based advocacy and list enhancement, recruiting a new generation of leaders, retaining high quality staff, nurturing and utilizing effective spokespeople and experts, and fundraising.

Tactics

1. In the first year, develop long-term strategies to increase the capacity in the community in three areas: leadership development, recruiting a new generation of leaders, retaining high quality staff.

2. Establish a "legislative training institute" in Washington, DC, both to recruit new people into the DC lobbying scene and to educate about lobbying "nuts and bolts." This should be undertaken in addition to, and possibly in coordination with, lobbying training conducted by grassroots organizations and networks.

3. Use the community survey to identify existing resources and expertise that can be tapped to provide training opportunities for other NGOs in the community on organizational development and programmatic issues.

4. See Goal 4. Hire professional firm to provide training to "generalist" spokespeople and others, as resources permit.

5. See Goal 6. Explore successful models in other communities to expand and strengthen membership, e.g., the Partnership Project. Recommend how to apply these models to the peace and security community.

6. See Goal 6. To recruit new e-activists or "members," establish an action-oriented web site, from which email action alerts will emanate (focused exclusively on peace and security issues), as well as online marketing efforts.

7. See Goal 9. Provide resources and training (using conference calls and workshops) to improve the fundraising capacity of organizations in the following areas: major donor, internet, membership and planned giving.

GOAL 9

We will develop a fundraising strategy that identifies funding needs and assesses current allocations, identifies new sources and opportunities, determines how to increase the utility and efficiency of grantmaking, and is aimed at overcoming immediate funding shortfall.

Tactics

1. Drawing on the results of the community survey, identify those areas of work where additional resources are needed.
2. Provide resources and training (using conference calls and workshops) to improve the fundraising capacity of organizations in the following areas: major donor, internet, membership and planned giving.
3. Recruit a team to approach and make presentations to potential major donors, small and medium-sized family foundations and donor networks.
4. Organize a series of independent funder briefings to educate target markets, convened by existing funders and/or the Peace and Security Funders Group (PSFG).
5. In consultation with PSFG, assign one or more foundation officers responsibility for liaison with other funder affiliation groups (e.g. environmental grantmakers, human rights funders.)
6. PSFG should encourage its members to synchronize to the greatest degree possible the proposal narrative, budget presentation, and grant reports required of grantees. Members should also be encouraged to provide more multi-year grants and general support grants.
7. Create opportunities for funders and NGO staff to have discussions that increase transparency of foundation processes.

V. Choices and Decisions Necessary to Achieve Success

To act strategically is to make choices. The tactics recommended for the achievement of the individual goals listed above require many complex judgments. For example, these include: what are the key policy objectives of the community, which "messages" best communicate and advance these policies, which constituencies offer the possibility of effective alliances, where to find possible new funders and how best to approach them. In addition, the peace and security community faces some fundamental issues that affect its overall ability to implement this strategic plan. The most pressing of these are noted below.

- The peace and security community must determine what goals and actions should be given priority in terms of timing and resources. The following section on a timeline for implementation starts to address these questions by providing recommendations on sequencing work.
- An efficient division of labor among NGOs and foundations will depend on individual and collective decisions about who should do what.
- Limited financial resources may require decisions about reorganization at the level of the individual organization and the community as a whole.

VI. Timeline for Implementation

The immediate task is to charter the Implementation Committee so that it will be ready to start work at the first of the year. As a first order of business the committee will synthesize information gathered at regional meetings in October and November, 2003, to identify the three to four policy objectives that all parts of the community are encouraged to adopt as key elements of their own programs. The committee will develop a process for determining policy objectives that have broad consensus within the peace and security committee

Another priority task of the Implementation Committee is the establishment of at least four Working Groups as recommended by the plan. The Working Groups will be composed of policy analysts (Goal 2), communications experts (Goals 3 and 4), legislative experts and lobbyists (Goal 5), and field organizers (Goal 6). As stated earlier, it is expected that at least one member of the Implementation Committee will participate in each Working Group. In those instances in which a Working Group was not recommended to accomplish a given goal (goals 1, 7, 8, and 9), an Implementation Committee member will be given responsibility to facilitate the implementation of the recommended tactics by working with ad hoc groups and individuals.

While work can and should proceed on all fronts, the rapid accomplishment of select tactics is particularly important. It is hoped in the initial six-month period (January – June 2004) that the following specific work is done

expeditiously. A proposed notional schedule for accomplishment of the tactics over the next two years is in Appendix D.

January – June 2004

- Establish Policy Working Group and recruit co-chairs
  - Create up to ten position statements
  - Disseminate position statements and provide briefings
- Establish message/communications Working Group
  - Evaluate and draft message
  - Identify target audiences
  - Brief and disseminate message to NGO's
  - Identify and recruit spokespeople
- Establish field organizers Working Group
  - Establish email based membership drive
  - Work with anti-war coalitions
- Get legislative work underway
  - Organize "breakfast" group for Members of Congress
  - Organize core staff group
- Get fundraising tactics underway
  - Work with PSFG to encourage use of standardized proposal and reporting forms
  - Conduct fundraising training (conference call or workshop)
  - Send team to prospective funders

VII. Human and Financial Resources

Accomplishment of these goals will require a net increase in foundation and individual support. NGOs are currently working with very tight budgets caused by the reduction of nearly one third in foundation support for the activities of the peace and security community over the past decade. As budgets shrank so have total number of staff. Thus, a net increase in human resources is also needed. Current budgets cannot support an expansion of their activity and in some cases, are not adequately supporting basic operations. Thus the most urgent prerequisite is sufficient funding to ensure that NGOs are able to maintain basic operations and the core capabilities of the community, as well as a significant additional amount of support to allow them to take on the individual and joint activities recommended in this report.

The additional, related costs of implementing the recommended tactics – that is for services other than for NGO personnel and basic operations -- are not tremendous. Detailed budget information is not available at this time; a very rough estimate of total expenses is on the order of $750,000. The most costly activities are NGO training in legislative work, communications and fundraising

sessions; use of media and public opinion professionals for message development and media placements; possible use of professional lobbyists; website operation, meetings and gatherings of various types, and printing of policy statements and supporting materials. Assuming several foundations share the load, it is clearly possible to secure support for these activities on an ongoing basis. The bigger challenge is to ensure that those organizations and individuals who are needed to carry out the work have sufficient funding to be stable and viable.

Greater efficiency in how funds are allocated and used can decrease the total amount needed. The community survey will help point out areas of redundancy for both NGOs and funders, hopefully prompting reallocation of some resources. The strategic plan itself should result in a more sustained and more collective focus of effort for both NGOs and funders, encouraging a shift of resources away from less important activities. Greater collaboration can lessen the need for organizations to try to do everything by themselves while increasing productivity. Fundraising burdens could be lessened by standardized forms and a greater degree of consensus on strategy.

VIII. Conclusion

The combined capabilities of the diverse community to promote a more peaceful and just world are considerable. There is no shortage of talent and dedication. However, the community faces formidable challenges in the form of external political forces, internal gaps and weaknesses, and a funding shortfall. The Planning Group's work underscored the issues that must be successfully addressed in order to overcome these challenges; several of the most pressing are noted below.

First, the difficulty of securing funding has stretched some groups to the breaking point and prevented most others from growing. As stated earlier, a net increase in funding is needed simply to ensure that NGOs are able to maintain basic operations, in addition to a significant increase to allow them to intensify and increase their output. Second, individual NGOs should evaluate their programs and strategy for effectiveness and focus, using the strategic plan as a guide, and make changes where necessary. It is tempting, but self-defeating, to pursue a program because it is what one knows how to do well rather than because it contributes to a cohesive strategy. Third, collaboration in implementing programs and cooperation in ensuring an efficient division of labor and resources is essential. This means expanding existing collaborative efforts and initiating new ones. In tough financial times when organizations think first of their survival, it is understandably difficult, but critical that they act in accordance with the needs of a larger community.

The initiative to strengthen the peace and security community described in these pages was an ambitious undertaking with several unique features. It

emphasizes collaboration among the many different parts of the community, both in terms of the process of developing a strategy and in the content of that strategy. For many people these meetings offered an opportunity to meet colleagues they had heard about from afar for years. Certainly it was the first time that funders and grantees worked together intensively to develop strategy and tactics. This also marks the first time a sizable part of the community has tried to construct a unified plan of action for the coming years (a three-to-five year horizon) to realize an agreed long-term vision. The approach and components of the plan are offered as a basis for collective action. It is expected, and indeed desired, that it will be elaborated upon and repeatedly revised as we now turn our attention to the demanding task of putting it into action.

APPENDICES

A. Planning Group Participants
B. Design Team Members
C. Areas of Focus and Long Term Goals
D. Notional Timeline for Next Two Years
E. Strengthening the Peace and Security Community Process Map
F. Additional Individuals that Contributed to the Development of the Plan

Appendix A

Planning Group Participants

This list includes everyone that participated in at least one of the four Planning Group meetings. Most individuals participated in three or four meetings. Affiliations are listed for identification purposes.

David Albright, Institute for Science and International Security
Bobbie Wrenn Banks, Women's Action for New Directions
Bruce Blair, Center for Defense Information
Danielle Brian, Project on Government Oversight
Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment
Tom Clements, Greenpeace
Ian Davis, British American Security Information Council
Bruce Deblois, Council on Foreign Relations
Leslie Fields, Friends of the Earth
Meg Gage, Proteus Fund
Subrata Ghoshroy, Federation of American Scientists
Wade Greene, Rockefeller Family & Associates
Lisbeth Gronlund, Union of Concerned Scientists
Bill Hartung, World Policy Institute
Peter Hayes, Nautilus Institute
John Isaacs, Council for a Livable World
Marylia Kelley, Tri-Valley Cares
Henry Kelly, Federation of American Scientists
Gordon Kerr
Michael Klare, Hampshire College
Larry Korb, Council on Foreign Relations
Michael Krepon, Stimson Center
Priscilla Lewis, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Ken Luongo, RANSAC
Arjun Makhijani, Institute for Energy & Environmental Research
Kevin Martin, Peace Action
Tracy Moavero, Peace Action
Bobby Muller, Vietnam Veterans' Foundation of America
Bob Musil, Physicians for Social Responsibility
Patricia Nicholas, Carnegie Corporation
Janne Nolan
Ivan Oelrich, Federation of American Scientists
Christopher Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council
Jonathan Parfrey, Physicians for Social Responsibility-Los Angeles
Eli Pariser, MoveOn.org
Cheryl Ramp, Stimson Center
Sullivan Robinson

Joan Rohlfing, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Appendix A/Planning Group participants

Randy Rydell, UN Department of Disarmament Affairs
Bob Schaeffer, Public Policy Communications
Stephen Schwartz, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
David Speedie, Carnegie Corporation
Jim Steinberg, Brookings Institution
Ian Urbina, Middle East Research and Information Project
Susan Veres, Student Pugwash
Marissa Vitagliano, Open Society Institute
Joe Volk, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Frank von Hippel, Princeton University, Program on Science & Global Security
David Whitling, Student Physicians for Social Responsibility
Kristen Wolf, Spitfire Strategies
Chong-Ae Yu, Cornell University

Appendix B

Design Team Members

Naila Bolus, Ploughshares Fund
Susan Gordon, Alliance for Nuclear Accountability
Lukas Haynes, MacArthur Foundation
Daryl Kimball, Arms Control Association
Kevin Knobloch, Union of Concerned Scientists
Katherine Magraw, Consultant
George Perkovich, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Susan Shaer, Women's Action for New Directions
Chris Wing, Ford Foundation

Appendix C

Areas of Focus and Long Term Goals

The Planning Group identified seven key strategic areas in which it should focus its collective action to realize its vision. It then determined the specific goals that it seeks to accomplish in each area. The identified areas of focus along with the goals associated with them are listed below. Out of this list of goals, the Planning Group identified nine of them (indicated below in bold type) as highest priority. These nine goals are discussed further in Section IV.

1) Develop and refine the ideas, solutions and policies that further disarmament, cooperative security and the rule of international law.

a) We will write a compelling and persuasive overarching policy statement that supports our collective vision and:
   i) Is based on a few easily articulated principles,
   ii) Responds to public concerns and can respond to unfolding events,
   iii) Recognizes strengths as well as weaknesses of existing international institutions,
   iv) Is consistent with values that resonate with the public.

b) We will determine research needs and identify questions that must be answered to advance our goals.

c) We will develop a suite of position statements and policy frameworks that address emerging and existing security challenges, along with supporting materials (e.g. summaries, talking points), to be used in the presidential campaigns and beyond.

d) We will develop specific policy recommendations (e.g. legislation, diplomatic initiatives, ways to strengthen enforcement of existing agreements) to be implemented in the near term.

2) Develop the message and means to effectively promote these ideas and policies.

a) We will develop initial message recommendations to argue for our policy agenda based on a more complete understanding of how people think about these issues.

b) We will recruit and engage a number of messengers from Congress, academia, thinktanks, business, the media, etc.

c) We will establish a clearinghouse/coordinating committee to identify strategic targets, manage and disseminate the message, and conduct trainings.

d) We will ensure that political campaigns – most importantly the presidential campaign but also Congressional ones -- will look to this community for answers and feel compelled to have formal positions on our set of issues.

3) **Engage and mobilize diverse sectors of the public**
   a) We will develop a strategic plan that identifies the highest priority geographic targets and constituencies, and actions to hold elected officials accountable.
   b) We will seek alliances and collaboration with a number of other key sectors and constituencies (e.g. labor, environment, Latino, Arab/South Asian, Jewish, students, retired military, business, faith, women, human rights and other communities of color.)
   c) We will increase the membership base of organizations and the number of partner organizations ten-fold in part by developing and formalizing alliances that were formed in the anti-war movement.
   d) We will dedicate resources to voter registration and "Get Out the Vote" efforts, including collaborative efforts with other constituencies.
   e) We will approach peace/disarmament groups in other countries with whom we'd like to work more closely and choose at least one possible security-related issue or activity to pursue in a joint effort.

4) **Influence US government officials and policy**
   a) We will triple the number of active champions in the US Congress and cultivate a bipartisan group of moderates who can help win legislative victories.
   b) We will develop a legislative strategy informed by our policy agenda that builds our base and appeals to broader political constituencies.
   c) We will increase NGO's and funders' understanding of how to directly engage with political leaders and candidates and to carry out focused legislative campaigns within legal restrictions.
   d) We will recruit and coordinate influential opinion leaders inside the beltway and in targeted states and districts to communicate our positions to members of Congress and key government officials.
   e) We will increase the lobbying capacity of our community and improve the lobbying coordination and effectiveness.

5) **Build effective and diverse organizational capacity and strengthen the collaborative community infrastructure**
   a) We will develop a plan to maximize the effectiveness of available resources directed towards the identified priorities.
   b) We will implement coordination mechanisms among funders, thinktanks, policy groups, advocacy/activist groups and academics to maximize the impact of each sector.
   c) We will focus on increasing capacity in the following areas: direct and grassroots lobbying, leadership development, internet-based advocacy and list enhancement, recruiting a new generation of leaders, retaining high-quality staff, nurturing and utilizing effective spokespeople and experts, and fundraising.

6) **Support a new generation of leaders, activists and experts**
   a) We will establish and fill five new positions each year for young people in our field.

b) We will maintain and if possible expand fellowships and internships at key organizations (including existing programs such as Scoville Fellowship, New Voices, AAAS fellowships) and support networks of young professionals.
c) We will encourage colleges to require scientific and technology students and relevant policy majors to have at least one course in international and national security and we will reach out to college-based Peace Studies programs.
d) We will assess existing organizing training programs for activists and political leaders and identify opportunities and gaps.

7) Increase and sustain funding for the Peace and Security Community

a) We will develop a fundraising strategy that identifies funding needs and assesses current allocations, identifies new sources and opportunities, determines how to increase the utility and efficiency of grantmaking, and is aimed at overcoming immediate funding shortfall.

b) We will have developed an immediate plan to harness the new interest in international peace issues by:
   i) Utilizing web-based fundraising,
   ii) Harnessing interest of and providing advice to family foundations and major individual donors through regional briefings and other tactics,
   iii) Establishing an institutional liaison with the entertainment/arts community.
c) We will increase NGO's understanding of how to diversify funding (e.g. planned giving, major donor fundraising, membership development, challenge grants.)

Appendix D

Notional Timeline for the Next Two Years

January – June 2004

- Establish Policy Working Group and recruit co-chairs
    - Create up to ten position statements
    - Disseminate position statements and provide briefings
- Establish message/communications Working Group
    - Evaluate and draft message
    - Identify target audiences
    - Brief and disseminate message to NGO's
    - Identify and recruit spokespeople
- Establish field organizers Working Group
    - Establish email based membership drive
    - Work with anti-war coalitions
- Get legislative work underway
    - Organize "breakfast" group for Members of Congress
    - Organize core staff group
- Get fundraising tactics underway
    - Work with PSFG to encourage use of standardized proposal and reporting forms
    - Conduct fundraising training (conference call or workshop)
    - Send team to prospective funders

July – December 2004

- Implementation Committee
    - Synthesize information from Planning Group meeting
    - Monitor progress on all tracks
    - Plan activities for next six months
- Planning Group
    - Identify new themes for 2005
    - Funding Training
    - Legislative Training
    - Review position statements
    - Review messages
- Policy Working Group
    - Review and revise position statements
    - Disseminate position statements and provide briefings

Appendix D/ Notional Timeline

- Message/Communications Working Group
    - Evaluate message impact
    - Refine message
    - Train and place spokespeople
- Implement Capacity-Building Plan
- NGO consultation regarding legislative priorities
- Conduct and Provide Legislative Training (conference call or workshop)
- Continue legislative breakfast group and core group meetings
- Fundraising
    - Organize strategic approaches to new funders
    - Recruit program officers to attend other affinity groups
    - Conduct fundraising training (conference call or workshop)

January – June 2005

- Implementation Committee
    - Synthesize information from Planning Group
    - Monitor progress on all tracks
    - Plan activities for next six months
- Planning Group
    - Funding training
    - Review position statements
    - Review message
- Policy Working Group
    - Review and revise position statements to address new themes
    - Disseminate position statements
    - Provide briefings
- Message/Communications Working Group
    - Review and revise messages in accordance with new themes
    - Place spokespeople
    - Evaluate message impact and refine
- Field organizers Working Group continuation
- Legislative breakfast group and core group meetings
- Implement Capacity-Building Plan
- Fundraising
    - Funder's briefing
    - Conduct fundraising training (conference call or workshop)


Appendix D/ Notional Timeline

July – December 2005

- Implementation Committee
    - Synthesize information from Planning Group
    - Monitor progress on all tracks
    - Plan activities for next six months
- Planning Group
    - Identify new themes for 2006
    - Funding training
    - Legislative training
    - Review position statements
    - Review message
- Policy Working Group
    - Review and revise position statements
    - Disseminate position statements
    - Provide briefings
- Message/Communications Working Group
    - Review and revise messages
    - Place spokespeople
    - Evaluate message impact and refine
- Field Organizers Working Group
- Breakfast Group and core group meeting
- NGO Consultation on Legislative Strategy
- Implement Capacity-Building Plan
- Conduct Legislative Training (conference call or workshop)
- Fundraising
    - Funder's briefing
    - Conduct fundraising training (conference call or workshop)

Appendix E

Strengthening the Peace and Security Community: Process Map



Process Map created in collaboration with the Interaction Institute for Social Change 10/17/03

Appendix F

Additional Individuals that Contributed to the Development of the Strategic Plan

Throughout the process, Design Team members, along with Planning Group members, consulted others (listed below) with particular experience or expertise to get the benefit of their thinking. Affiliations listed for identification purposes.

Carol Allen, Coalition for Peace Action, NJ
Tom Andrews, Win Without War
Joni Arends, Concerned Citizens for Nuclear Safety, NM
Ed Arnold, Physicians for Social Responsibility, Atlanta
Susan Bales, Frameworks
Joan Blades, MoveOn.org
Hugh Brady, Office of Rep. John Spratt
Steven Brion-Meisels, Massachusetts Peace Action
Leslie Brockelbank, WAND-Oregon
Bridgette Burge, Peace Action, Peace LEAP, North Carolina
John Burroughs, Lawyers Committee Nuclear Policy, NY
Tom Cardamone, Center for Arms Control and Nonproliferation
Francis Chiappa, Cleveland Peace Action
Michael Christ, IPPNW, Boston
Dr. Sidney Clarke
Tom Cochran, National Resources Defense Council
Michael Coffey, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
Jay Coghlan, Nuclear Watch of New Mexico
Marty Collier, United Methodist Church – GA
Tom Collina, 20/20 Vision
David Cortright, Fourth Freedom Forum
Kathy Crandall, British/American Security Information Council
Madelyn Creedon, Senate Armed Services Committee
David Culp, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Ann Curtis, Network
Charlie Curtis, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Ivo Daalder, Brookings Institute
Nancy Donaldson, Downey McGrath Group
Gita Drury, Active Element
Constance Eiseman, Prospect Hill Foundation
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Cicley Gay, Students' Action for New Directions
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Brenda Girton Mitchell, National Council of Churches
Jean Gordon, WAND – Arkansas
Barbara Green, Churches Center for Theology and Public Policy
Mort Halperin, Open Society Institute
Edward Hammon, Sunshine Project
Carol Husten, Peace Action New York
Ralph Hutchison, Oak Ridge Environmental Peace Alliance
Wayne Jaquith, Peace and Security Funders Group
Frances Jett, United Methodist Church
Marcia Joonbeth, Peace Action Connecticut
Mike Keller, Anne Arundel Peace Action, Maryland
Rich Killmer, Churches Center for Theology and Public Policy
June Kimmel, North Carolina Council for Women
Julia King, WAND – Indiana
Andy Lichterman, Western States Legal Foundation, California
Terri Lodge, Arms Control Advocacy Collaborative
John Loretz, IPPNW, Boston
Yaney MacIver, Oregon Peaceworks
Ram Manikkakingam, Rockefeller Foundation
Conrad Martin, Charles Stewart Mott Foundation
Jeffrey Martin, Stanley Foundation
Maureen McCabe, WAND – Iowa
Claire Meade-Rosen, WAND – Michigan
Greg Mello, Los Alamos Study Group, New Mexico
Johanna Mendelson, UN Foundation
Alfred Meyer, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Wisconsin
Allistair Millar, Fourth Freedom Forum
Bridgette Moix, Friends Committee on National Legislation
Melissa Murphy, Sacramento Peace Action
Michael O'Hanalan, Brookings Institute
Xander Patterson, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Oregon
Maria Ramos, Greenpeace USA
Marie Reitman, WAND – DC
Cynthia Ryan, Schooner Foundation
Michael Schiffer, Office of Senator Diane Feinstein
Ira Schorr, Physicians for Social Responsibility
Bob Schwartz, New York Peace Action
Ed Scott, Nuclear Threat Reduction Campaign

Appendix F/ Additional Individuals

Darcy Scott Martin, WAND
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P.J. Simmons, Rockefeller Brothers Fund
Mark Sommers, Mainstream Media Project
Glenn Stassen, Peace Action – California
Todd Stein, Office of Rep. Tom Allen
John Steinbrenner, University of Maryland, Center for International Security Studies
Bill Towe, North Carolina Peace Action
Jacque Travis, WAND – Oregon
Maria Valenti, Physicians for Social Responsibility – Boston
Jim Wallis, Sojourners
Cora Weiss, Samuel Rubin Foundation
Jennifer White, Student Peace Action Network
Billy Wimsatt, Active Element
Stephen Young, Union of Concerned Scientists