Congress Urged to See Nonproliferation Funding as Defense Spending

Today's top nuclear policy stories, with excerpts in bullet form.

Stories we're following today - Friday,  April 1, 2011:

Nuclear Agency Officials Warn Against Proposed Spending Cuts - Martin Matishak for Global Security Newswire [link]

• Proposed spending cuts to the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration for the remainder of this budget year would have a "significant" impact on the agency's nuclear stockpile and nonproliferation operations, NNSA officials told an influential panel of lawmakers on Wednesday.
• The nearly $1 billion in reductions contained in H.R 1, the House version of the complete fiscal 2011 spending bill, create "uncertainty" about ongoing arsenal life-extension programs, multibillion-dollar infrastructure projects and decisions about the size of the agency work force, NNSA Administrator Thomas D'Agostino told the Senate Armed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
• Members of the Senate panel's House counterpart last week sent a unanimous letter to House Budget Committee Chairman Paul Ryan (R-Wis.) asking that requested NNSA funding be preserved in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 and classified as national security spending to prevent future reductions
• The nuclear agency is implementing an "aggressive but important" program to meet the president's goal of securing the world's loose fissile materials within four years, D'Agostino told lawmakers.
• He said the proposed cut would impact the agency's ability to implement the "first line of defense" measures to secure nuclear materials in place; convert HEU-fueled research reactors to use proliferation-resistant low-enriched uranium fuel; and install radiation detectors at seaports, border crossings and airports around the globe.

Pakistan in Nuclear Upswing - Olli Heinonen for The Huffington Post [link]

• The world's five original nuclear weapons countries have all suspended production of fissile materials for new weapons and are negotiating cuts in their nuclear arsenals. But one nuclear-armed nation is heading in the opposite direction. Pakistan is steadily building more nuclear weapons, adding production capacity to produce plutonium and enrich uranium, and building new missiles to deliver nuclear warheads.
• The nuclear risks in Pakistan are three-fold: its non-proliferation record is poor, there are concerns about the security of sensitive nuclear materials, and there is no sign of a slowdown in its nuclear weapons drive. A global response needs to be calibrated to address all three of these potential threats.
• The evidence suggests that Pakistan is trying to develop a second-strike nuclear capability. Pakistan already has brought to a halt the negotiations in Geneva for a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, sought by President Obama and virtually the entire membership of the Disarmament Conference. Pakistan has tested cruise and other missiles that can carry strategic warheads from land or even from submarines.
• Another reason why the world needs to focus on ensuring that Pakistan's nuclear material, particular at the bulk handling facilities, remains under proper safeguards is because Pakistan is not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or NPT. In other words, the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to provide comprehensive safeguards is limited. In the longer term, this raises a further challenge of creating effective multinational mechanisms that exercise oversight over countries that remain outside the NPT and not just those countries that voluntarily operate within the system.

NPT 2010-2015: The Way Forward - Sameh AboulEnein for The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace [link]

• The action plan agreed during the last Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference in May 2010 strengthened the voice of those who believe that the NPT is the most effective multilateral path towards global nuclear disarmament. The ratification of New START, the US-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty which came into effect in February 2011, is another positive development on this path, but there is still a long and essential road ahead, particularly in the Middle East.
• Success at the 2015 Review Conference, and thereby the future of the whole nonproliferation regime itself, is increasingly contingent on achieving genuine progress on two key issues: progress by the Nuclear Weapon States toward meeting the commitments they undertook in 2010; and the clear and credible commitment on the part of participants—including from the region—to the forthcoming 2012 conference to establish a zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.
• The 2010 NPT Review Conference reconfirmed that without good-faith progress on these two issues, member states will continue to be increasingly resistant to calls for tighter restrictions on the transfer and use of nuclear technology to increase confidence in the nonproliferation regime, or to attempts to strengthen measures against non-compliance and withdrawal .
• A more genuine and candid conversation about nuclear disarmament, dismantlement, nuclear roll-back, transparency and verification is needed. There has not been such an exchange for many years, and all opportunities that exist to make this happen should be utilized.

China Reacts to Fukushima - Gregory Kulacki for "All Things Nuclear" a Union of Concerned Scientists Blog [link]

• The dark cloud hanging over the future of nuclear power because of the unfolding crisis in Japan may have a silver lining in China by increasing attention to reactor safety.
• Within days of the earthquake that crippled the nuclear plants in Japan, the Chinese government abruptly suspended approvals for new plant construction, suspended work at new plants currently under construction, and ordered a comprehensive review of its licensing and regulatory procedures.
• It’s highly unlikely that China will follow Germany and talk of abandoning nuclear power given the pressing energy demands of a nation of 1.4 billion consumers with rapidly rising expectations and incomes. There are indications, however, that in the wake of the public panic in China unleashed by the accident at Fukushima Daiichi, the senior Chinese leadership will give much greater attention to the inherent risks of nuclear energy and begin, in earnest, to develop and deploy the robust safety and regulatory mechanisms it needs to manage those risks.
• Before the suspension China had 25 new reactors under construction and had approved plans for an additional 32. Having been awakened to the political risks of nuclear power, China’s leaders can be expected to act in their own best interest, and begin to reconsider what is needed for China to build and operate those plants safely.