Grumbling from the House on START Follow-on Treaty

Stories we're following today:

Ros-Lehtinen on Arms Control - ArmsControlWonk [link]

• Ileana Ros-Lehtinen rounds up the usual crowd to co-sponsor an utterly meaningless “Sense of the House” on the START Treaty. (Utterly meaningless since the Senate ratifies treaties. I don’t even want to hear about implementing legislation.)
• The resolution is largely about China, and how that might impact the START Treaty, which is a very odd thing to say given the disparity between US and Chinese nuclear forces.
• Max Bergman was more succint: “North Dakota could deter China.”

U.S. Assures North Korea of 'Robust' Direct Talks Channel - Associated Press 

• "We will make clear to them that should they return to the six-party process and should they reaffirm their commitments" under a 2005 disarmament pact, "then there is available to them a robust channel for bilateral dialogue," said State Department spokesman P.J. Crowley.
• But if Pyongyang agrees, the U.S. can promise "a robust channel for bilateral dialogue with which we could discuss a wide range of issues," Crowley said.

Who's In Charge of Korea? - Foreign Policy's The Cable [link]

• With Obama envoy Stephen Bosworth, above, finally visiting Pyongyang and a lot of names floating around, Cable readers may be wondering: Who's in charge of Korea, anyway? We've got you covered.
• In general, Obama's Korea team is largely devoid of the factionalism and infighting that hampered Korea policymaking during the Bush years. The players, although spread across agencies and with various responsibilities, are largely on the same page.
• At the top level, strategic decisions are being guided by James Steinberg, the deputy secretary of state, and Jeffrey Bader, the NSC's senior director for Asia.

U.S. to Unveil Biological Threat Strategy - The Washington Post [link]

• The Obama administration has decided not to support a global monitoring system for biological weapons, a move that affirms an earlier determination by the Bush administration but that will disappoint some nonproliferation experts.
• White House officials said the strategy includes an increased focus on international collaboration and on the prevention of biological attacks, as well as on the response to them.
• Still, the strategy is notable for what it doesn't include: a way to enforce the Biological Weapons Convention.
• Daryl Kimball, director of the Arms Control Association, said he was disappointed that the administration didn't come up with a creative way to "put some teeth into" the convention.

Breaking the U.S.-Russian Deadlock on Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons - Miles Pomper, Nikolai Sokov and William Potter in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists [link]

• Although unwilling to include limitations on nonstrategic nuclear weapons in the current negotiations, U.S. and Russian officials have indicated that nonstrategic nuclear arsenals might be addressed in a new set of arms control talks that is expected to commence after the START replacement treaty is ratified.
• It would make more sense to move forward separately with nonstrategic nuclear weapons and then, if progress is achieved, integrate strategic and nonstrategic reductions at a later stage as part of a broader U.S.-Russian agreement on all categories of nuclear weapons.
• For many years Moscow's position on nonstrategic nuclear weapons has been inflexible and stagnant. ... Effectively, Russia is betting that NATO, which is the custodian of the U.S. nuclear weapons stationed in Europe, will refuse to accept that principle, and therefore, it will not have to take meaningful measures to address its own nonstrategic weapons.
• To utilize this opportunity, Washington could put forward a statement on its own, or on behalf of NATO, in conjunction with unilateral nonstrategic weapon withdrawal in which it would disclose basic information about its total nonstrategic stockpiles (including those on U.S. territory) and invite Russia to respond in kind.