Key Obama Advisor Tapped to be Ambassador to Russia

Today's top nuclear policy stories, with excerpts in bullet form.

Stories we're following today: Wednesday, June 1, 2011.

Why McFaul as Ambassador to Russia is a Solid Pick by Obama - By Will Inboden in Shadow Government [link]

• President Obama intends to nominate NSC Senior Director Michael McFaul to be the next ambassador to Russia. This is an inspired choice.
• McFaul will bring a compelling set of attributes to the position, including a deep knowledge of Russia, a close relationship with President Obama, experience in high levels of government and national security policy, and a longstanding commitment to democracy and human rights promotion.
• As the U.S. ambassador in Moscow, the very capable McFaul will have considerable opportunity not only to observe Russia's ongoing transitions, but hopefully to help shape it as well, in directions conducive to U.S. interests and the welfare of the long-suffering Russian people.

Obama Aides Dismiss Seymour Hersh's Iran Story - By Jennifer Epstein in Politico [link]

• The Obama administration is pushing back strongly [against Sy Hersh's Iran article], with one senior official saying the article garnered “a collective eye roll” from the White House.
• “[A]ll you need to read to be deeply concerned about Iran’s nuclear program is the substantial body of information already in the public domain, including the most recent IAEA report,” a senior administration official said.
• “We’ve been clear with the world about what we know about the Iranian nuclear program: Tehran is keeping its options open despite the fact that the community of nations demands otherwise,” [a senior intelligence] official added.
  

U.N. Chief Urges Strengthened Nonproliferation Regime - Global Security Newswire [link]

• U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon on Tuesday urged that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty be refortified as the principal foundation for working toward a world without nuclear weapons.
• "All member states share a common interest in building a world in which the use of nuclear weapons is not simply improbable, but impossible,' Ban said in remarks at a forum in New York aimed at strengthening global mechanisms for curbing proliferation and supporting disarmament.

Don't Strangle New START - By William Hartung in Talking Points Memo [link]

• Anti-arms control ideologues like Rep. Michael Turner (R-OH)...have tried to use the House's recently passed National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) to undermine New START while tying the President's hands should he want to make further reductions in our nuclear arsenal.
• Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association has rightly described Turner's efforts -- paralleled in the Senate by Jon Kyl (R-AZ) -- as a "poison pill for U.S. nuclear security."
• It is in our interest to make the reductions outlined by New START as soon as possible, not throw absurd impediments in the way. We should be moving forward towards additional nuclear cuts and a global nuclear test ban, not re-fighting policy issues that have already been settled by a vote of more than two-thirds of the U.S. Senate.

North Korea Rejects Secret Offer of South Summit - Jeremy Laurence in Reuters [link]

• North Korea delivered a stinging rejection of the South's proposal for a series of three presidential summits over the next year, giving a blow-by-blow account on Wednesday of a secret meeting between officials of the two countries last month.
• Both the United States and China -- the main allies of the South and North, respectively -- have urged the rivals to return to the negotiating table to sort out their differences to allow for the resumption of stalled nuclear talks.

NSG Should Lead By Example on Sensitive Technology Transfers - By Pierre Goldschmidt in Proliferation Analysis [link]

• There are two major concerns the NSG needs to consider regarding proposed changes to its Guidelines governing trade in enrichment and reprocessing technology.
• First, it is vital to ensure that International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities do not lapse if a State withdraws from the NPT. And second, it is essential to make clear that a regional arrangement such as ABACC can in no way meet the objective of the Additional Protocol (AP) and cannot be considered as a substitute for the latter.
• In addressing these two issues, NSG participating governments should demonstrate that they have no intention to seek commercial advantages at the expense of nonproliferation requirements.