How Many Nukes are Enough?

On the radar: Rethinking deterrence needs; War, containment, and false choices; Gard: cut costly, unnecessary nukes; Report on Iran’s early nuclear work; “Serious and substantive” talks; 123 negotiations with Jordan; “A lot has changed since 1999”; and The option left off the table.

February 23, 2012 | Edited by Benjamin Loehrke and Mary Kaszynski

How many nukes are enough? - “The idea that the United States, or any nation, can have enough nukes to "win" a nuclear war is now recognized as futile,” writes McClatchy in an editorial asking “Just how many nuclear weapons should be enough.”

--The editorial doesn’t pick a number. Instead it says, “Whatever size the arsenal turns out to be, its goal will be simply to deter another nation from launching a nuclear attack,” not turn the rubble of enemy targets into dust.

--Politics: The editorial notes that President Obama has pledged to “put an end to Cold War thinking,” while budgetary pressures incentivize cuts to excessive nuclear programs. On the other side, “Congress has its ‘Doomsday Caucus,’ comprising members whose districts and states have large military or nuclear industry facilities. The Cold War was good to them...All politics, even nuclear politics, are local.” http://owl.li/9ffoN

The fallacy of containment - “Paradoxically, the most likely road to containment is the very course war proponents advocate: a near-term preventive strike on Iran's nuclear program,” writes Colin Kahl in The Hill. A preventive strike, however, could legitimize the regime, convince Iran to go nuclear, and shatter the international consensus. Kahl’s conclusion: “The war hawks want would likely be a prelude to failed containment, not a substitute for it.” http://owl.li/9ffTm

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Rethinking nuclear strategy - ”Our current nuclear force structure is a holdover from an era where the overarching goal was deterring a Soviet nuclear attack on the United States or an invasion of Europe,” writes Lt. Gen. Robert Gard in The Hill. “In a time of limited budgets and scarce resources, it would be irresponsible not to consider reductions in weapons that most national security experts see as of marginal strategic value. ” http://owl.li/9ffI7

Tracking Iran’s early nuclear efforts - Nuclear researchers at the Institute for Science and International Security have acquired and analyzed a trove of 1,600 telexes from the 1990s that provide insight into the early years of Iran’s clandestine nuclear program.

--”The telexes and other records show Iranians using subterfuge and deception to obtain the parts they needed, and afterward issuing vigorous denials to U.N. nuclear officials, even when confronted with evidence,” writes Joby Warrick for The Washington Post. http://owl.li/9ffP4

ISIS Report - “The Physics Research Center and Iran’s Parallel Military Nuclear Program,” by David Albright, Paul Brannan and Andrea Stricker. (pdf) http://owl.li/9ffQK

Getting Iran to back down - “History shows that the clerics in Tehran won’t accept a deal unless they conclude that there’s no alternative but a punishing war. Somehow, the United States must convince Iran that this confrontation is deadly serious — and then work to find the rational pathway toward agreement,” writes David Ignatius for The Washington Post. http://owl.li/9feu1

Readout from DPRK talks - "The talks were serious and substantive. We covered a number of issues...My hope is that we can find a way to move forward with the North, because it's in everyone's interest to try to get onto the next phase, which will be six-party talks," said Amb. Glyn Davies of the recent US-North Korea talks.

--"I find it a positive sign that relatively soon after the beginning of the transition in North Korea, the DPRK has chosen to get back to the table with us. That's a good thing." http://owl.li/9fesm

Case-by-Case with Jordan - The U.S. has resumed civilian nuclear trade talks with Jordan. During negotiations in 2008, Jordan refused to agree to forswear acquiring uranium enrichment capabilities - thereby scrapping the “gold standard” for such trade agreements. If negotiations with Jordan do not produce controls on enrichment and reprocessing technology, expect the deal to get hammered by lawmakers and nonproliferation experts from across the political spectrum who support abiding by the “gold standard.” Global Security Newswire has the story. http://owl.li/9feqT

Pity the fact checker - “Gingrich misses target on Iran's nuclear effort,” from CNN. http://owl.li/9feol

Misreading North Korea - “Instead of premising their actions on intelligence estimates, policy makers might learn to reduce uncertainty by diplomatic give-and-take, probing for information by making offers and seeing whether the North accepts them and keeps its commitments. Their reluctance to do so makes North Korea a long-running policy failure much more than an intelligence failure,” writes Leon Sigal in The National Interest. http://owl.li/9femE

”A lot has changed since 1999” - The administration is making the case for CTBT ratification, acting undersecretary of state for arms control Rose Gottemoeller said, emphasizing improvements in verification technology. Kate Brannen reports for Defense News. http://owl.li/9fela

Tweet - @TheOnion: “Obama: No Option Off The Table Except Snatching Iran's Leaders With Hook Lowered From Plane And Flying Them To D.C. http://onion.com/xzp7Xs”