Evaluating the Nuclear Weapons Labs

On the radar: Politics, performance reviews, and the nuclear labs; Burns on diplomacy; No blank check for nuclear spending; Des Browne on U.S.-Russian mistrust; Striking a deal with Iran; New START numbers; Niue signs; Counterproductive talk of war; and the Case for the CTBT.

April 10, 2012 | Edited by Benjamin Loehrke and Mary Kaszynski

Disconnect - The release of performance evaluations of the nuclear labs shows a disconnect between “went on in the nuclear weapons programs [and] what’s said about them in the nation’s capital,” The Washington Post’s Walter Pincus writes.

--“The reviews are important for many reasons, but one critical one is money. Built into the contract are incentive fees awarded based on results of these performance reviews.”

--Bottom line: “The NNSA is focused on function, while some members of Congress appear more worried about the timing and politics of funding.” http://owl.li/absH8

Burns on talks - “[The upcoming P5+1 talks with Iran are] an opportunity to see whether Iran is prepared to engage in serious negotiations over its nuclear program, in particular whether it is willing to engage concretely on practical steps that can build confidence in its intentions regarding its nuclear program. We want to establish a sustainable process that can produce tangible results,” said Deputy Secretary of State Bill Burns in an interview with Al Monitor. http://owl.li/absz2

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Live from Pyongyang - NBC’s Richard Engel is reporting from the DPRK this week on the rocket launch and all things North. Follow him @richardengelnbc.

Nuclear spending meets budget reality - “We certainly can't afford to give each branch of the military a blank check for weapons systems we don't need,” writes Jeff Blum, executive director of USAction, in The Baltimore Sun.

-- On nuclear, Blum writes, “We maintain a vast and redundant nuclear arsenal that brings very little national security benefit and is more relevant to the Cold War than any 21st century threats. Instead of escalating our own nuclear arsenal, we should be dedicated to preventing rogue states and terrorist organizations from acquiring nuclear materials.”

--Don’t forget the pork. “Hugely expensive projects like nuclear submarines and a new generation of bomber contribute more to defending the bottom line of major contractors than they do to defending America.” http://owl.li/abucg

Concessions - “Any de-escalation of Iranian nuclear activities must be accompanied with a de-escalation of sanctions in order for a deal to be struck,” writes Trita Parsi in Huffington Post. “The problem [with the U.S. proposal] is not necessarily the demands, but the imbalance between what is demanded and what is offered.”

--“On the one hand, a change of behavior should be rewarded with a reduction of pressure. On the other hand, additional pressure is deemed necessary in order to coerce the sanctioned state...This contradiction risks collapsing the talks because the sanctioned state will likely only accept that its concessions are met with additional pressure if it so weak that it has no choice but to accept capitulation.” http://owl.li/absC9

Des Browne on U.S.-Russian relations - There is a fundamental mistrust between the U.S. and Russia that is contaminating the efforts to advance security cooperation, notes former UK Secretary of State for Defence. He offers areas of cooperation that could change that distrust and advance a common Euro-Atlantic Security space.

--Included: enhanced missile defense cooperation, extended early warning and decision time, reciprocal reductions in nonstrategic weapons, and full implementation of New START. Read his full speech at the Russian Council on International Affairs. http://owl.li/absEV

--Kicker: ”In my view, the current U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons stationed in Europe are militarily useless and should be reduced in number, consolidated to fewer bases, and eventually removed altogether. Not everyone in NATO agrees with me and it is not clear what the future of these weapons will be.”

Number of the day - 1,492: Russia’s number of deployed strategic warheads, according to the State Department’s latest release of New START data. That’s about 70 warheads down from the last data exchange (in September ‘11) and 60 less than the New START ceiling.

--The U.S. has 1,737 warheads on 1,040 delivery vehicles. More numbers here. http://owl.li/abseF

”Routine deployment” - For the first time since June 2010 the U.S. has deployed a second aircraft carrier to the Persian Gulf, a move the Navy calls “routine and not specific to any threat.” AP reports. http://owl.li/abs9Q

183rd CTBT signatory - The island nation of Niue (population 1,211, total area roughly 1.5 times the size of Washington DC) just signed the CTBT. http://owl.li/absvL

Scotland and the nuclear alliance - “There would be a fundamental inconsistency in accepting the role of nuclear weapons in NATO's security, but demanding their rapid removal from one's own national territory,” argues Malcolm Chalmers about the possibility of Scottish independence and the question of what to do with the UK submarine base at Faslane. Global Security Newswire sums up his argument. http://owl.li/abstT

--Read Chalmers’ full paper: “Scottish Independence: ‘From Darien to Faslane’ http://owl.li/abssp

Event - “Campaign 2012: The Challenge of Containing Iran,” a panel with Michael Doran, Suzanne Maloney and Shibley Telhami. Today, 1pm, at Brookings. Details and RSVP here. http://owl.li/absqf

Risks of the military option - “Unpopular regimes like Iran's relish the rally-around-the-flag effect created by a military confrontation,” writes Rebecca Griffen of Peace Action West. “The threat of action is damaging enough. The reality would be devastating to all Iranians, especially for those who have been speaking out for justice and democracy.”

--On congressional action like the Graham-Lieberman-Casey resolution, Griffen writes, “Disrupting diplomatic efforts on the eve of talks is highly counterproductive, but that's not stopping politicians on both sides of the aisle who seem ready and willing to ignore the advice of national security professionals.” http://owl.li/absbK

CTBT - “In this day and age, concerns about the maintenance of the stockpile and verification of the [test ban] treaty are no longer compelling arguments,” writes Kingston Reif in The Bulletin. “The United States should ratify the CTBT as soon as possible: It has nothing to lose and everything to gain.”

http://owl.li/abskK