Nuclear Insights: 3 Key Questions on the Inauguration

In preparation for the inauguration, we asked four individuals from our community with a variety of backgrounds to answer a few questions about the nuclear aspects of the Inauguration Day transfer of presidential power: Ben Rhodes, former Deputy National Security Advisor to President Barack Obama, and co-host of the podcast Pod Save the World; Amy McGrath, former US Marine Corps fighter pilot and political candidate in Kentucky; Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, former US Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security in the Biden administration; and Jon Wolfsthal, Director of Global Risk at the Federation of American Scientists and former Special Advisor for Nonproliferation and Nuclear Security for then Vice President Biden.

Question 1: What typically happens during the transition of the “nuclear football” from one president to the next during the inauguration? 

Ben Rhodes: The President is briefed in advance of the inauguration about the nuclear chain of command, so is prepared to assume this momentous and surreal responsibility. The same motorcade that takes the outgoing president to the inauguration then takes the new president back to the White House. What changes is the person sitting in the back of the Beast (presidential limousine). It’s a reminder that the nuclear football is permanent, and the president is temporary.

Bonnie Jenkins: The top three or four issues regarding a particular subject that the current administration thinks is important are passed during the transition to the incoming administration transition team. The new administration will decide what issues they want to prioritize or take on. For example, when I was part of the Biden transition team, the extension of New START was at the top of the list I briefed to the Biden teams. There was a need to do the extension very soon after the inauguration. Fortunately, President Biden and his incoming NSC agreed and quickly informed Russia that the U.S. wanted to extend New START. Russia agreed, and the treaty was extended.

Amy McGrath: I don’t know the exact specifics but here’s how I would describe it. In our country, the acting president has the sole ability to employ nuclear weapons either as a first use (or first strike) or in a retaliatory way (in response to a nuclear attack against us or our allies). The “codes” are the way in which we ensure that the order to launch is, in fact, coming from the president himself.  Those codes reside in a briefcase called the “football”. So, when the new president is sworn into office, the briefcase gets handed from the military aide of the outgoing president and into the hands of the military aide of the incoming president. The other option is that you have one military aide on duty and that officer simply switches from following the outgoing president around everywhere to following the incoming president around everywhere.

Jon Wolfsthal: The United States has only one President at a time.  On January 19th, the President-elect will receive a briefing from senior military officials explaining to him how the nuclear launch process works and laying out how the President’s ability to order a nuclear strike happens. At precisely 12:00 noon on January 20th, after taking the oath of office, the legal authority over America’s nuclear arsenal transfers from one president to the next.  At that point, the entire nuclear enterprise – launch codes, authorizations and personnel shift the focus from one person to another.  The officer who travels with the nuclear “football” containing everything a President needs to order a nuclear strike is already on site near the incoming and outgoing Presidents, so logistically, not many changes but legally and operationally, the entire operation shifts from one person to another.

Question 2: In your opinion, which inauguration marked the most monumental transfer of presidential power to launch US nuclear weapons? 

Amy McGrath: They have all been monumental since the dawn of the nuclear age. Truman worked to make sure the civilian head of our government (president) has the power to employ these weapons. Eisenhower, a military man himself, delegated that power back down to the military. Kennedy took that power back to the presidency and started what we now call the “football” to ensure the president had the sole authority to employ such weapons. Ever since that time, each transfer of power has been monumental due to the president having so much authority.

Ben Rhodes: The transition from Truman to Eisenhower, because it was the first transition of the power to destroy humanity from one human being to the next. After that, I think the transition from Obama to Trump because it was the first transition to somebody who was so outside the norms of experience, behavior, and temperament of previous presidents.

Jon Wolfsthal: There is no question that the transfer of power from Donald Trump to Joe Biden marked a remarkable delicate period in American history.  There was serious high-level concern that Donald Trump might refuse to yield power in 2021 and that he might try to precipitate a nuclear event to achieve that goal.  These concerns were so serious that the Speaker of the House wrote a public letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the top military advisor to the President and to the Congress, asking whether Trump might use nuclear weapons to hold power.

Bonnie Jenkins: I will say that the inauguration is the most concerning. The reason is that the potential Secretary of Defense will have access to the nuclear codes. Hegseth, if confirmed, will not be the type of Secretary of Defense who would say no to Trump. If Trump wants to use nuclear weapons, will Hegseth agree? That makes me very nervous indeed.

Question 3: Given what we’ve seen, heard, and read about President Elect Trump’s nuclear weapons policies, what are the greatest challenges or opportunities for nuclear weapons issues?

Jon Wolfsthal: The US is spending more than $50 billion a year on nuclear weapons, and cost overruns are now the norm. Trump has expressed a desire to “get along” with Russia and President Putin, which could include some notional deal to replace the soon to expire nuclear arms control agreement known as New START.  No one – not even Trump – knows how these pressures and competing factors will play out.  But it seems clear that the next four years will include increasing global emphasis on the usability of nuclear weapons, and US friends and adversaries alike may try to take advantage of the US at a time of internal division and growing isolationist trends.

Bonnie Jenkins: Our relationship with nuclear weapons countries China and Russia and challenging countries like Iran and North Korea. The U.S. relationship with nuclear possessor countries is of concern overall, and how those relationships will impact decision-making in the U.S. is a real issue.

Ben Rhodes: Two challenges. First, the building nuclear arms race, fueled by the nearly 2 trillion-dollar US modernization plan at a time when China is building out its nuclear arsenal and Russia is threatening use. Second, the heightening risk of great power conflict, which is higher than at any time since the Cold War. The opportunity is a potential – though not likely – focus on cutting aspects of the defense budget converging between Democrats, fiscal hawks, and DOGE.

Amy McGrath: The greatest challenge is Trump himself. He has been ignorant of the nuclear triad and has used nuclear bluster in reckless ways in the past. The only opportunity I see is if Trump were to decide to implement a no-first-use policy or work with Russia on arms control, his GOP (normally against such policies) would fall in line.